

# DEVELOPING EFFECTIVE ARMED FORCES IN THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY CASE STUDIES OF NEW DEMOCRACIES

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*The purpose of this article is to contribute to a better understanding of the contemporary value for democracy of the relationship between elected leaders and the armed forces. Hence, it focuses on the military effectiveness dimension of the CMR. It discusses why it is important and what newer democracies can do to successfully develop effective armed forces. The article provides “lessons learned/best practices” of achieving effectiveness from three developing democracies - Chile, Hungary, and, Mongolia.*

**Key words:** civil-military relations, defense institution building, military effectiveness, lessons learned, developing democracy

## 1. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this article is to contribute to a better understanding of the contemporary value for democracy of the relationship between elected leaders and the armed forces. It draws from an article written in collaboration with Thomas Bruneau, and published by *Democratization* in 2008, entitled “Towards a New Conceptualization of Democratization and Civil-Military Relations”, which expanded the prevalent civil-military relations (CMR) concept (concerned primarily with the armed forces and narrowed to issues of military intrusion in domestic politics through *coups d'état* and asserting civilian control) to a conceptualization and framework that better suit the twenty-first century security landscape - a trinity of democratic civilian control, effectiveness (fulfilling the assigned

roles and missions - from war, to peacekeeping, to intelligence, to counterterrorism), and efficiency (fulfilling the assigned roles and missions at a minimum cost) of the security forces (armed forces, police forces, and intelligence agencies).

This article focuses the military effectiveness dimension of the CMR. It discusses why it is important and what newer democracies can do to successfully develop effective armed forces. The article provides “lessons learned/best practices” of achieving effectiveness from three developing democracies - Chile, Hungary, and, Mongolia. While a comparison between the three countries may seem a stretch at first glance due to different geographic locations and historical backgrounds, the three countries are actually worth comparing, for at least the following reasons: they include three democratization areas (Latin America, Eastern Europe, Asia);

they were repressive dictatorships; despite the dictatorial pasts, they are considered consolidated democracies after twenty years or so; they progressively yet successfully engaged in CMR and Defense Institution Building (DIB) reforms since the end of the non-democratic regimes; and, they are currently important security actors both regionally and globally (e.g. in various global security and peace operations and missions), which is a proof of achieving effectiveness.

## **2. RELEVANCE OF THE TOPIC**

In this article, I aspire to achieve three goals. First, I hope to complement the current research and literature on civil-military relations and DIB. Virtually all of the literature on the armed forces in established democracies is concerned with democratic civilian control over them. In the newer democracies, the literature usually focuses on how to achieve the control supposedly already existing in the more established democracies. That is because policy makers in new democracies, especially in those where the military was the government during the previous non-democratic regime (e.g. Latin America) and still enjoys prerogatives it negotiated during the transition to democracy, tend to focus CMR reform only on control. Control also remains relevant as more traditional issues of coups have, however, not totally disappeared (e.g. Honduras, 2009 or Ecuador, 2010).

There is, however, less attention in the literature on democratic consolidation and civil – military relations, especially in relation to what the armed forces do; that is, their effectiveness and the implications of their roles and missions for democracy. This is very surprising because today, when the traditional inter-state conflict has virtually disappeared (with few exceptions), very few militaries are primarily trained, resourced, and prepared to wage combat with other armed forces; armed combat is probably the least likely role that militaries are currently carrying out. More specifically, armed forces today are involved in peace support operations (PSO), in “nation building” (e.g. in Afghanistan), in fighting street gangs (e.g. Haiti in 2007), which is more typically a police function, in supporting or supplanting police forces in operations to combat drug trafficking and street crime, or fight terrorism (e.g. Mexico). This combination of activities are the issues that democratically elected policy makers must deal with to meet domestic and, increasingly, global expectations and standards. The exclusive focus on civilian control in this literature is a significant impediment to understanding the larger and more complex relationships concerning democracy and security forces, particularly when we consider this very wide spectrum of roles and missions. I hope this article will begin to fill these lacunae. Second, I hope to interest policy makers in newer or

currently emerging democracies on why it is incumbent on them to invest time and effort in developing effective armed forces in a security context that lacks traditional conflict, and how they can contribute to reform. Third, I expect the article to be relevant to policy makers and armed forces in developed democracies, which are increasingly encouraging cooperation with newer democracies to avert national and global security threats. It is important for governments in developed democracies to know they can cooperate with compatible and capable armed forces from newer democracies, which are also accountable.

### **3. EFFECTIVENESS IN FULFILLING ROLES AND MISSIONS**

As previously mentioned, I have learned from my experience with the Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) and National Security Affairs (NSA) Department of the NPS, in working with civilians and military officers in consolidating democracies that CMR (and democratic reform of the armed forces) should not focus entirely on civilian control. Thus, while civilian control is considered a fundamental aspect of democratic consolidation, and is not assumed to exist in any particular case, it is only a part of the analysis [1]. Analysis of how effective security forces are is also necessary to understand the contemporary importance for democracy of the relationship between elected leaders and the military.

As previously mentioned, armed forces are not solely fulfilling traditional combat missions. Currently, there are at least six [2] major categories of roles and missions that armed forces carry out: 1) fight, and be prepared to fight, external wars; 2) fight, and be prepared to fight, internal wars or insurgencies; 3) fight global terrorism; 4) fight crime; 5) provide support for humanitarian assistance; and, 6) prepare for and execute peace support operations. It is a very broad spectrum of roles and missions, which democratically elected civilians must deal with effectively in order to fight national and international security challenges. Thus, focusing CMR reform only on civilian control hinders the larger and more complex relationships concerning democracy, elected policy makers, and security forces. In a democracy, policy makers craft and implement security decisions and policies that are in service of safeguarding democratic values, national interests, and citizens; successful policies, however, go hand in hand with effective security forces. Even when civilian control is unquestioned, as in the United States, civilian control by itself is no guarantee that the policy-makers will make good decisions, or implement policy in such a way as to result in military success.[3]

But what does military effectiveness involve? Effectiveness in fulfilling any of the six roles and missions requires the following: First, there must be a plan in place, which may take the form of a strategy or even

a doctrine. Examples include national security strategies, national military strategies, strategies for disaster relief, doctrine on intelligence, counter terrorism doctrine and the like. Second, there must be structures and processes both to formulate the plans and implement them. These would include Ministries of Defense, National Security Council-like organizations, or other means of interagency coordination. Third, a country must commit resources, in the form of political capital, money, and personnel, to ensure it has sufficient equipment, trained forces and other assets needed to implement the assigned roles and missions. Lacking any one of these three components, it is difficult to imagine how any state would effectively implement any of these roles and missions.

Although it is rather difficult to assess success of effectiveness [4], what comes out clearly from the preceding discussion is the importance of the institutions as a MOD and a NSC. That is, they are critical to making the armed forces work, or not. There is evidence from new, and not so new, NATO countries that they created robust institutions, which are staffed by certain numbers of civilians, with some level of expertise, and with stability (such as members of the National Security Councils, Ministers of Defense, Deputy Ministers, heads of departments and offices within the militaries, as well as subject matters experts). Nevertheless, these countries were more or less required

from outside (e.g. NATO membership requirements) to recruit civilians and make them stable in their positions. Conversely, countries in Latin America lack such institutions. At a minimum, they have recruited civilians (and provided them with stable careers), but for administrative jobs (Argentina, Chile). In those cases where there are subject matter experts, their positions are not stable (Argentina). Democratic control can also contribute to military effectiveness. If there is a certain amount of willingness and interest (whether due to internal or external incentives), but also knowledge and expertise in defense and security (e.g. policy makers know what questions to ask and how to provide recommendations to improve the activity of the military) on the part of the elected civilians, armed forces can fulfill their responsibilities better. As CMR scholar Deborah Avant contends, “Having more civilians control the army made it easier, not harder, for the army to maintain its focus” [5]. Institutionalizing control and oversight in a way that provides top-level direction and general oversight guidance, as opposed to malfeasance or cronyism, leads to improved effectiveness. In the US, the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act is a good example to this end. It both reinforced democratic civilian control and mandated jointness for the military services in the United States. Colombia is also an interesting case. President Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010) undertook strong personal

control over the armed forces, police, and intelligence organizations, and compelled them to confront the internal conflict with the FARC. The resultant was improved security.

#### **4. CASE STUDIES**

During my work with CCMR, I have had the privilege to research democratic civil-military relations in several newer democracies, including Chile and Hungary (which I also visited in summer and respectively fall of 2010) and Mongolia (through discussion with colleagues and NPS students). While there is no claim here that these three are a “representative sample” of military effectiveness, they are “lessons-learned/best-practices” which contrasts them from most countries in the world, where very little in fact is happening in terms of civil-military relations and defense institution building, especially regarding developing effective armed forces. They can provide data and insights that may be of use to other countries, should the political will exist to implement change. For each country I based my research on the following four questions:

1. Has the country developed a plan in place, which may take the form of a strategy or even a doctrine?

2. Has the country developed institutions (e.g. structures and processes) that have or are in the process of formulating these plans and implementing them? If yes, do these institutions and plans involved interagency coordination?

3. Have the civilian policy makers committed resources, in the form of political capital, money, and personnel, to ensure the respective country has sufficient equipment, trained forces and other assets needed to implement the assigned roles and missions?

4. If either or all of these developments have taken/is taking place, what has motivated/is motivating the civilians to invest in effectiveness of the military?

It must be emphasized from the very beginning that most of these cases were intentionally selected as examples of achieving effectiveness in military reform; in most countries with which I am familiar, policy makers are unable to contribute or are not at all interested in defense reform in general, let alone effectiveness.

##### **4.1. CHILE [6]**

Chile has started its journey to democratization with a big gap between two worlds: an emerging civilian government and a strong, independent, and influential military, which emerged from the dictatorship with the highest prerogatives among all Latin American neighbors (including high resources for the military through the “Copper Law” enacted in 1973, which stipulates the military gets 10 percent of all export revenues from the state-owned copper company CODELCO, for weapons and equipment acquisitions). Reducing the gap between the two worlds (e.g. by strengthening civilian interest, expertise, and authority



over the military while decreasing the influence of the Armed Forces in the politics and government and focusing on professional issues) has therefore been rather protracted and cumbersome, but not without reaching the desired effect. Fortunately, Chile has incrementally developed democratic Defense Institution Building and strengthened democratic CMR, including effectiveness (which has involved plans, structures/institutions, interagency processes, as well as resources). After two decades of democratization, the civilian government has come to understand the need for an effective military as a mean and tool to further and consolidate foreign policy, and, secure economic gain, while the military has understood that democracy is the “only game in town” in Chile and therefore civilian guidance and oversight is part of the game.

Due to the legacy of the past, it is not surprising that for many years since the transition, civilians’ main objective was asserting democratic civilian control. Preoccupation for effectiveness, however, emerged during the administration of Eduardo Frei Ruiz Tagle (1995-2000), and further developed by presidents Ricardo Lagos (2000-2006), and Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010). President Frei had a “carrots-and-sticks” approach related to CMR: attempts to balance strengthening democratic civilian control (thus decreasing military prerogatives) while supporting military effectiveness and professionalism. During the Frei administration,

Minister of Defense Edmundo Pérez Yoma took a keen role in developing Defense Policy. He initiated several civilian and military debates among officers from the Ministries and Armed Forces, civilians from the Congress, think tanks, academic institutions and other non-military organizations. By the late 1990s, the military came to accept the civilian “right” to develop defense policy, a natural prerogative in a consolidated democracy. President Ricardo Lagos (2000-2005) sought to continue the dialogue on effectiveness and modernization of the Armed Forces. He looked into conferring the military a *raison d’être* in a time of peace, which brought about positive changes in the Armed Forces’ attitudes toward constitutional reforms, civilian decisions, democracy, and human rights. The new Constitution adopted in 2005 provided a clearly external orientation for the armed forces (while still having limited domestic roles, such as in emergency situations). Changes in recruitment (including the draft and the acceptance of women in the Army and the Navy), overhauling the force structure, strengthening joint structures and operations, and reforming acquisitions, doctrines and military education and training also took place. Frei and Bachelet administrations were marked by some important legislative changes, which triggered a series of institutional, organizational, and structural transformations. After procrastination for five years, the Law on the Organization and Functioning of the Ministry of Defense (MOD Law) was approved in February 2010,

at the end of the Bachelet tenure, which left the task of implementation to the new Government of President José Piñera (2010 – present). The MOD Law is expected to bring “big” changes to both democratic control and effectiveness (and, to some extent efficiency) of the “revolutionized” Armed Forces and MOD, with an emphasis on better defense policies, increased civilian roles in designing and developing defense planning and strategic thinking, and increased effectiveness of Chile military while deployed in international missions. The Law led to the creation of a series of new structures within the MOD, including a Joint Chiefs of Staff (which has an operational function), as well as an Undersecretary for Defense Policy Office (which develops defense and military policy and conducts the main defense planning). MOD civil society representatives are confident this Law, and the Office will effectively support civilian policy makers to decide what Armed Forces are needed in the future and for what purposes, establish a relationship between the decision to develop forces with the decision to deploy them (e.g. for external defense, peace and stability operations, or even internally to take care during disasters, etc.), how much to spend on defense and how can efficiency be ensured and measured, how joint systems will be, what keep what get rid off from military etc. Sources within the MOD expect that interagency coordination and cooperation within the defense/security sector will also be improved.

Chilean authorities expect all the desired outcomes of the MOD Law to be implemented/fulfilled within the next four to five years.

Through the public policy agenda developed in 1995, DSP began to shape. DSP documents (strategic assessments, national strategic plans, strategic defense plans, as well as the White Book of Joint Doctrine), as well as the 2005 Constitution emphasize the internationalization of the Chilean military through participation in peace, stability, and reconstruction operations, as well as strengthening neighborly and regional cooperation. The White Book (2010) is based on the NATO and Spain’s doctrines (following discussions with the joint chief of staff from Spain who showed MOD officials their doctrine) yet adapted to Chile’s peculiar security and defense related realities and needs. That is because Chileans want to participate in international forces, which brings to the agenda interoperability and the effectiveness.

What also contributed to strengthening military effectiveness in Chile was participation in international Peace Operations. The military participation in such international and regional operations has been mutually beneficial to both the civilian and military elites: for the former, involvement in PSO is part and parcel of civilian governments’ extended foreign/diplomatic and economic policy agendas (as the Chileans acknowledge that globalization does not only bring free trade and diplomatic ties but also security

challenges and threats which imply shared security responsibilities); for the latter, it ensures the preservation of institutional *raison d'être* (with all financial and moral benefits) in a security environment that moves away from the traditional inter-state conflict and in an overall global context of economic hardship, as well as a great opportunity for boosting professional experience and effectiveness; to both parties, such participation helps maintaining the already established normality, stability, dialogue, and transparency in civil-military relations. The expertise and experience acquired by Chile's military during international operations was tested during the events during and ensuing the devastating February 2010 earthquake [7]. The earthquake experience demonstrated Chilean military effectiveness (e.g. PSOs taught the armed forces how to deal with civilians when reinstating order due to previous engagement and interaction with NGOs representatives and others in PSO, stability and reconstruction operations via internationally-established Rules of Engagement [ROEs], a perhaps different outcome twenty years ago when the Chilean military was not involved in PSO). The Armed Forces have now very high population trust and support from society. Professional Military Education (PME) and Civilian Defense Education (CDE) have also helped increase effectiveness.

Chile is a great example of mutual willingness by the civilians and the military institutions to accept and undergo democratic reforms, not only in terms of control but also

effectiveness (due to perceived threats, and in relation with international security cooperation that the country supports, which have implications not only for security ties, but also for economic and foreign relations). Chile could also be relevant to other new democracies (especially those that are not from South Eastern Europe (SEE), do not have NATO and/or EU to provide them with a checklist of accession requirements to foster reform) in that Chile has followed NATO doctrine (focusing on Spain's in particular) to base their defense policy – again, among other reasons, in order to ensure the military is effective and interoperable in international coalitions. Chile, thus, provides an example of how a non-aspirant NATO country can use NATO model to undertake military reform (thus, showing that NATO can have an indirect effect on the military reform in countries that do not necessarily seek to or cannot become members).

#### 4.2. HUNGARY [8]

Hungary is an example of successful development of effective armed forces. Hungary has effective armed forces, especially when contributing to Stability, Reconstruction, and Peace Operations. NATO membership has greatly impacted the reform, in that it forced the hand of the Hungarian government to create or reorganize institutions involved in bringing about armed forces' effectiveness. The road to effectiveness, however, has been long and hampered by several obstacles. First, interest in



effectiveness, did not emerge until Hungary joined NATO (1997-1999), and even then it was minimal. That is because governments “started out from the mistaken assumption that NATO accession would not occur any time soon” [9]; as a result, policy makers “supported as much the military reform as it was necessary for achieving the invitation of NATO”. [10] Defense reform basically involved budgetary cuts for defense, personnel downsizing (including civilian), as well as slow development of a host of military reform plans (but with virtually zero chance and time for implementation). With regard to resources for defense, the civilian elites in Hungary focused only on ensuring the military officers got paid, but increasingly cutting [11] military budgets for any reform programs. The lack of financial resources held back military restructuring and modernization programs (including procurement, as well as research and development) [12], stalled domestic and international education and training (including PfP-conducted exercises, very important for interoperability with international Allies and Partners), made recruitment difficult (as well as retaining volunteers), and reduced the morale within the armed forces (due to relatively low pay and poor housing conditions)[13]. The pace of the reform, however, changed after [14] Hungary received an accession invitation from NATO in 1997 (although due to upcoming elections, the administration procrastinated the development of any major reforms).

During the late 1990s, especially after NATO integration, accelerated and more comprehensive defense reforms toward an expeditionary NATO contributing force have taken place: reforming personnel and training; decreasing the number of officers; interoperability of units to be assigned to NATO, and disposing of redundant armament and equipment (2002-2006); further modernization and procurement (e.g. new vehicles, armaments, such as Gripen JAS 39 fighter plans, Harris and Kongsberg tactical radios, new transport vehicles), and cutting down more military facilities (2006-2010); improving living and working conditions for Hungarian armed forces personnel (comparable with their NATO counterparts), developing attractive career paths in the military, and increasing the number of NCOs (2010-2013). Likewise, it was not until NATO integration that Hungary’s had seen an increase in the defense budget. Yet, since then the Defense Budget has been decreasing continuously. Moreover, 9/11 was an eye opener for reconstructing the Hungarian Armed Forces, especially from the perspective of increasing interoperability with NATO. Hungary has been participating in Afghanistan and although Al Qaeda is not a direct threat to Hungary’s national security, it has been a threat to its military in Afghanistan (i.e. “withdraw or suffer more casualties”), but decision makers seem to pay little attention to this. Second, and related to the previous, DSP has developed at a very slow pace, due to lack of experience and expertise (e.g. on

what to do with the military, how to prepare the military for future roles and missions, what relations to build with different factions, such as political and civil society arenas), as well as other priorities (e.g. economic reform). It was not until 1993, when the Parliament issued the “Basic Principles of Security Policy”, the first document that dealt with security and defense; it was followed by the “Basic Principles of National Defense” later that year. These two documents set out roles and missions of the armed forces (e.g. to defend the country), as well as the basis of the Hungary’s DSP. Based on these documents, the Government has to issue and review the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy [15]. Nevertheless, before 1997 (the year when Hungary got an invitation to accede to NATO) and 1999 (the year of actual accession into NATO), and even after NATO membership, Hungary had no NSS, or NMS. It has been a long waited process. In the spring of 2001, MOD and MFA designed and developed the first NSS (MFA is in charge of coordination of the development of the NSS), which was approved by the Parliament in 2002. The process was integrative in that the MOD and MFA invited outsiders (including civil society, parliament members) to discuss and debate it. The National Security Strategy sets the stage for the development of Ministerial strategies, such as Military, Foreign Relations, Law Enforcement, Finance, Information Systems, and the like (Hungary’s NSS). Up to date, however, only the Foreign Relations and Military Strategies have been

developed. NMS was developed in 2008 by the Minister of Defense. MOD also invited representatives of the General Staff, Ministry of Justice to assist developing it. In addition, civilian experts (e.g. former deputy secretary of defense policy, think tanks, researchers, and others) were invited to debate it. Very interesting, the Ministry of Defense also invited the representatives of the Ministry of Finance to ensure the latter learn and understand what is required for ensuring effectiveness of the armed forces’ Roles and Mission (especially budget related issues), with the ultimate goal to increase funding for the military. The NMS was adopted in 2009. Today, DSP in Hungary consists of a hierarchy of different documents, including the Constitution (which is rewritten as we speak, and will be approved next year), the Law on Hungary Defense Forces, the Resolution No. 94/1998 of 1998 Hungarian National Assembly on “The Basic Principles of the Security and Defense Policy of the Republic of Hungary”, NATO Strategic Concept and all other related documents, as well as the EU Common Security and Defense Policy.

Under these circumstances, Hungary provides a good example of how a military struggles, due to insufficient resources and even precarious plans and policies, to overcome effectiveness. Nevertheless, it also provides an example of how effectiveness can be achieved through subregional/regional cooperation, NATO membership, as well as participation in international missions led by UN, NATO, OSCE, etc.

Even if the traditional external threat has virtually disappeared (which, however, Hungary's military does not totally exclude), which has minimized the armed forces' focus on fighting external wars, participation in regional/international peace operations, humanitarian relief, and countering terrorism efforts, are a few of Hungary's military current roles and missions. Hungary's contribution to regional cooperation has encompassed participation in the Visegrad group, the Central European Initiative (CEI), the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI), the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. NATO/EU membership requirements and accession programs such as PfP, IPP, PARP, have helped strengthen Hungary's armed forces interoperability and compatibility with its western counterparts. Effective contribution to UN, NATO, EU forces and/or OSCE operations has included the following: Strategic Airlift Capabilities, a Deployable Command, Control, Communications and Computer System (CIS) Module, a Deployable Communication Module (DCM) for operation theaters, military medicine capabilities, such as Operational Military Liaison Teams (OMLT) and Provincial reconstruction Team (PRT) in theater. Regional cooperation has encompassed participation in the Hungarian-Romanian Peacekeeping Battalion, the Multilateral Land Force (MLF) with Italy (Julia Alpine Brigade), Slovenia, and Croatia (since 2010), and the Tisa multinational engineer battalion with Romania, Ukraine,

Slovakia. Hungary is currently contributing troops to international operations and missions, including Iraq, KFOR, EU/UN/OSCE led operations, Afghanistan. Hungary's capabilities and professionalism has been praised on numerous occasions by foreign counterparts. [16] As recognition of Hungary's effective contribution to international missions (especially in the field of military medicine), NATO established in Hungary a Center Of Excellence in Military Medicine in 2009, as the primary source of military medicine expertise for NATO. PME, whose objective is achieving the three levels of interoperability with NATO in terms of education and training, has also contributed to improved military effectiveness.

All these led to a better understanding on the civilian side of the need for an effective military (especially due to Hungary's NATO/EU membership duties and obligations) in a security environment that lacks the threat of a traditional adversary. Hungary has become an important and effective contributor to military operations in the Balkans, Middle East, Africa, under NATO/EU/OSCE/UN umbrella. Hungary can serve as an example of achieving military effectiveness for other newer or emerging democracies.

### **4.3. MONGOLIA [17]**

Mongolia, bearing in mind its history and location, has successfully focused its CMR and DIB process reform on achieving effectiveness of the armed forces, in particular in peace support operations. There have

been at least four [18] incentives for Mongolia to become involved in peace support operations. First, is Mongolia's "third neighbor policy", whereby the country establishes alliances with like-minded nations, through multilateral action, in order to lessen the influence of immediate neighbors. Second, due to limited budgets for the military, the compensation for equipment and training by involvement in PSO is solid incentive. Third, is the increased emphasis on and preoccupation for utility of external standards for readiness, as well as the commitment to training and equipment. And, fourth, is Mongolia's post Cold War policy of "rebranding" the armed forces for international versus national purposes. All these incentives were motivating not only decision makers within the Ministry of Defense but also the civilians; "an all-party consensus that survived successive changes of government"[19]. Since approximately 2002, Mongolia has participated in PSO missions in Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, as well as ten UN - sponsored missions.

To achieve effectiveness in PSO, a series of reforms have taken place since the end of the Cold War. The 1992 Constitution provided for roles and missions of the armed forces. A new defense concept followed, coupled with various laws and regulations (e.g. Law on the National Security Council in 1992, the Law on Defense of 1993, a National Security Concept in 1994, and the Law on the Armed Forces of 2002) for the military, seeking to transform the Soviet-style armed forces into

a professional and interoperable military. Yet, until 2002, a majority of politicians and even senior military officers were reluctant to support Mongolia's participation to PSO (as they thought Mongolia military was not sufficiently trained to fulfill PSO missions). In addition, according to Bruneau and Mendee, the Mongolian armed forces were unknown to the UN DPKO and even its own Permanent Mission in New York. However, the US requests for troop contribution in Afghanistan and Iraq brought changes in the support for Mongolian PSO deployments in general, and armed forces effectiveness, in particular. The US request initiated a broad debate at the NSC and the parliament, prompted closer interagency coordination and cooperation among security-involved ministries and institutions, elicited additional resource allocations for the PSO (administrative, logistics, and training), and strengthened military cooperation with Western countries and neighbors. The Armed Forces Development Plan to 2015, followed, in 2006, a key financial commitment from political leaders to improve Mongolia's military effectiveness in PSO. The plan led to the creation of a PSO brigade, a Regional Peacekeeping Training Center, a medical field hospital, and other PSO capabilities. It should be noted that, in strengthening PSO capabilities of its armed forces, Mongolia has capitalized on U.S. Government support and assistance programs (including International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI)). A Law on Participation in the PSO, was enacted in 2010, which allows annual budget and resource



allocations for PSO, on the one hand, and fosters interagency coordination and cooperation in PSO, on the other. [20] Mongolia is another case where a non-aspiring NATO member uses NATO, alongside other Western defense reform standards, to shape DIB. This is explained by Mongolia's desire to move away from its Soviet past and become interoperable and compatible in international operations. The adoption of NATO standard HQ system in 2008, employment of Western PME standards at the Defense University in 2007, development of non-commissioned officer corps, self-sustaining English-training capability, have proved the departure from the Soviet-era.

More changes are coming regarding strengthening Mongolia's military PSO effectiveness, including, revision of National Security and Defense Concepts, and a stated goal of a potential increase in defense budget from 1.4 to 4.0%. All these have triggered strengthened interagency cooperation. Involvement in PSO has not only increased the armed forces' effectiveness and interoperability, but also led to more trust and support for the military by Mongolian society. PSO is being recognized as the foreign policy instrument for bilateral and multilateral cooperation among all Mongolian arenas (state, political, economic, civil).

## **5. ANALYSIS OF THE CASE STUDIES**

Based on my review of the Defense Institution Building and Civil-Military Relations developments in these three countries, I can summarize the following key points vis-à-vis achieving effectiveness of the armed

forces (a summary of the findings is displayed in **Table no. 1**).

At a minimum, military effectiveness requires political will and ongoing interest. Political will and interest can have an internal drive/incentive. On the one hand, it could be direct interest in developing democratic institutions (including effective armed forces), for rational grounds – such as punishing non-democratic regime abuses and preventing the continuation of these practices in the new democracy. Of the three case studies, Chile is a good example in this context. The outcome in Chile is transformed armed forces, more flexible and with more rapid reaction capabilities, with better guidance, direction, and coordination by the civilian decision makers, with new personnel (that had not been involved in human rights violations and abuses), which benefits from better/more attractive career paths, professional military and civilian education (both in country and abroad), and better budgeting policies. On the other hand, it could be awareness of the post-Cold War global security challenges and threats (e.g. intrastate conflict, failed states, terrorism, organized crime etc.), which have prompted security institutions adjust and redefine their roles and missions (with a heavy focus on external Peace Support and Stability Operations, or, in the case of India focused on internal security), in order to become more effective and professional. All three countries studied (Chile, Hungary, Mongolia) are excellent examples whereby awareness of threats by policy makers and military participation in PSO and other international missions have



led to improved effectiveness of the armed forces. Political will can also be motivated by external incentives. This could be “carrots and sticks” from NATO, EU. The two organizations membership (more than membership requirements), which included institutionalizing armed forces that are effective and interoperable, while under democratic control, have influenced Hungary develop and implement Western military effectiveness and professionalism standards. External incentives can also be a security/defense/intelligence crisis or failure (e.g. a terrorist attack, or a domestic security issue) that triggers developing or consolidating military effectiveness (e.g. Hungary, after 9/11).

I also observed that countries that had an external drive and incentive for CMR and effectiveness have been more advanced than the others in terms of reform (e.g. Hungary versus Mongolia). On the other hand, both Chile and Mongolia have proved that where political will exists to create democratic institutions by emulating NATO models (while, adjusting and using it for their own domestic needs), NATO can be useful to non-European countries when undertaking CMR.

Of the three countries, only Chile reflects an almost equal fulfillment of the three requirements (e.g. adequate plans, capable structures [interagency coordination/cooperation], and sufficient resources) for effectiveness. Hungary and Mongolia, on the other hand, have suffered from limited resources. They, therefore, had to capitalize on plans and structures (including coordination and cooperation) to successfully achieve effectiveness. Lack of expertise in

defense and security was a drawback for all three countries, but through PME/CDE this obstacle is being minimized. In addition, time was crucial for the countries that recorded military effectiveness; nothing has happened overnight: it took twenty years or so for all three countries to develop effective armed forces.

Although none of the surveyed countries falls in this category, CMR/DIB is not a linear process, and past experience is no guarantee of continued success. Therefore, civilians in democracies (old and new) need to remain focused on balancing military accountability with effectiveness, in order to ensure preserve security in and of their democracies.

Requirements for effectiveness of the Armed Forces Country	Plan	Structure (interagency coordination/cooperation)	Resources
Chile	Medium-high	Medium-high	High
Hungary	Medium	Medium-high	Low-medium
Mongolia	Medium	Medium	Low-medium

**Table no.1.** Summary of Findings – Fulfillment of Effectiveness Requirements per Country

## 6. CONCLUSION

My purpose in this article is to synthesize conceptually what I have learned in my experience with CCMR programs globally on the requirements for developing effective armed forces in newer democracies. I have

found that although achieving and strengthening military effectiveness is not always an urgent goal for the civilian elites, it is not ultimately an impossible job for civilians in new democracies. I, therefore, argue that the three countries have successfully developed effective armed forces, which are today reliable allies and partners in common international missions and operations. My research, with CCMR programs, of democratic security institution building suggests that civilian policy makers are key players in civil-military relations and defense reform, including creating effective armed forces. I hope the article to be relevant to policy makers and intelligence professionals in other emerging democracies.

#### 7. ACKNOWLEDGMENT

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#### ENDNOTES

- [1] British scholar of strategy, Hew Strachan also emphasizes effectiveness. See "Making Strategy: Civil-Military Relations after Iraq", *Survival* Vol. 48, Number 3, Autumn 2006: 59-82. In addition, British scholar of SSR, Timothy Edmunds, also looks to these issues. See Timothy Edmunds, "What *are* Armed Forces For? The Changing Nature of Military Roles in Europe" *International Affairs* Vol 82, No. 6, 2006, 1059-1075. Also, all of SSR proponents address effectiveness.
- [2] For a discussion on roles and missions, and the mixes in different countries, see Paul Shemella, "The Spectrum of Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces," in Thomas Bruneau and Scott Tollefson, eds. *Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil - Military Relations* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006).
- [3] See, for example, Thomas Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq* (New York: Penguin Press, 2006), for a well-researched account of the poor planning and implementation of U.S. security in Iraq with serious consequences for the administration of George W. Bush and indeed of United States' global prestige.
- [4] a discussion on why it is difficult to measure effectiveness, see Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, "Towards a New Conceptualization of Democratization and Civil-Military Relations", *Democratization* 15, no. 5, 2008, pp. 909 - 929.

- [5] Deborah Avant, “Political Institutions and Military Effectiveness: Contemporary United States and United Kingdom”, in Risa A. Brooks and Elizabeth S. Stanley, eds., *Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 87.
- [6] The author would like to thank the Center for Civil-Military Relations, the U.S. Embassy as well as the Chilean MOD and General Staff, Army War Academy, National Academy for Political and Strategic Studies Academia (ANEPE), and Social Sciences Institutes of the Diego Portales University, as well as members of the Chilean Congress, for facilitating invaluable interviews and discussions in support to this research. Other sources used by the author include: Mark Ensalko, “Military Prerogatives and the Stalemate of Chilean Civil-Military Relations”, *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 21 Issue 2, Winter 1995, pp. 255-270; Meredith Fensom, “Judicial Reform, Military Justice, and the Case of Chile’s *Carabineros*”, Paper prepared for delivery at the 2006 Meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, San Juan, Puerto Rico, March 15-18, 2006; Wendy Hunter, “Continuity or Change? Civil-Military Relations in Democratic Argentina, Chile, and Peru”, *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 112, No. 3, Autumn, 1997, pp. 453-475;
- Claudio Fuentes, “Military and Politics: Weaknesses in Chilean Democracy”, file:///H:/cmatei/DIB/CHILE/Military%20and%20Politics%20Weaknesses%20in%20Chilean%20Democracy.htm; Marybeth P. Ulrich, “Developing Civil-Military Competencies among Senior National Security Practitioners in Democratizing Latin America”, 2008, pp. 1-14; Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*, John Hopkins University Press, 1996; Wendy Hunter, “Negotiating Civil-Military Relations in Post-Authoritarian Argentina and Chile”, *International Studies Quarterly* (1998) 42, 295–318; Felipe Aguero “Democracy and the Future of Civil-Military Relations in Chile: An Exercise in Historical Comparison”, Working Paper of The Dante B. Fascell North-South Center at the University of Miami, Coral Gables, Florida, 1-25; Gregory B. Weeks, “The ‘Lessons’ of Dictatorship: Political Learning and the Military in Chile”, *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 396-412, 2002; Marcos Robledo, “Democratic Consolidation in Chilean Civil-Military Relations: 1990-2005”, in Thomas C. Bruneau and Harold A. Trinkunas eds., *Global Politics of Defense Reform*, Palgrave-Macmillan, 2008, pp. 95-127;

Roberto R. Flammia, "Copper Soldiers: Forging New Roles for the Chilean Military", Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2005, pp. 1-69; Justin Vogler, "Chile: Pinochet Gost, Bachelet Swamp", *Open Democracy*, 8 October 2007; Peter J. Meyer, "Chile: Political and Economic Conditions and U.S. Relations", Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report R40126, March 2, 2010, pp. 1-17; Luca B. Gunnels, "Defying Predictions? Chilean Civil-Military Relations since 1990", Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010, pp. 1-85.

[7] As the police could not alone handle the unrest that burst in some of the regions affected by the earthquake, after 48 hours of hesitation to involve the military, President Bachelet ultimately announced a state of calamity in those regions, and the Minister of Defense immediately involved the military to reinstate order in the regions in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior. The military succeeded in 12 hours, to take control of situation (9000 soldiers took control of 2 million people), without hurting one single person. According to sources from the MOD, for the Armed Forces, this resembled a humanitarian/stabilization operation only this time in a different, domestic, environment.

[8] The author would like to thank the Center for Civil-Military Relations, U.S. Embassy as well as the Hungarian MOD and General Staff, National

Defense University, Hungarian Defense Forces Central Training Base (CTB), and the Vocational School, for facilitating invaluable interviews and discussions in support to this research. Other sources: Todor Stoyanov Hitrov, "Civil-Military Relations in Post-Communist Countries", Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2004; Dunay, Pál, "The Half-Hearted Transformation of the Hungarian Military", *European Security*, 14:1, 2005, 17 — 32; "Central European Civil-Military relations and NATO expansion", RESDAL; Imre Takacs, "Reform of Civil-Military Relations in Hungary in Context of Joining NATO", Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2001; Ferenc Molnar, "Military Reforms in Hungary", Paper presented at the International Workshop on "The Challenges of Security Sector Reform in Macedonia", Skopje, 6 – 7 December 2002; Ferenc Molnar, "Civil Society and Democratic Civil-Military Relations - The Case of Hungary", Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control OF Armed Forces (DCAF) Working Paper No. 101; Mark Yaniszewski, "Post-Communist Civil-Military Reform in Poland and Hungary: Progress and Problems", *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 28, Issue 3, March 2002; "Breakthrough of Civil-Military Relations in Hungary", No Author; Zoltan Szenes, "The Implications of NATO Expansion for Civil-Military Relations in Hungary", *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*,

- 1743-9116, Volume 17, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 78 – 95; Tibor Bozo, “Hungary a Member of NATO. The road membership of NATO 1990-1999”, U.S. Army War College, Strategy Research Project, April 2003; <http://www.coemed.hu/coemed/erterw>.
- [9] Dunay, Pál, “The Half-Hearted Transformation of the Hungarian Military”, *European Security*, 14:1, 2005, 17 - 32
- [10] Ferenc Molnar, “Military Reforms in Hungary”, Paper presented at the International Workshop on “The Challenges of Security Sector Reform in Macedonia”, Skopje, 6 - 7 December 2002.
- [1] Except a minor increase in 1993
- [12] Instead of buying new equipment improve old Russian one (minor modernization in air defense) cut back of various infantry units number, C4I, recon, ISTAR capabilities very limited
- [13] “Central European Civil-Military relations and NATO expansion”, RESDAL; Mark Yaniszewski, “Post-Communist Civil-Military Reform in Poland and Hungary: Progress and Problems”, *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 28, Issue 3, March 2002; “Breakthrough of Civil-Military Relations in Hungary”, No Author; Imre Takacs, “Reform of Civil-Military Relations in Hungary in Context of Joining NATO”, Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2001
- [14] A different situation from other countries which sped up reform prior NATO integration but underwent a “relaxation” period after accession (e.g. Romania)
- [15] Tibor Bozo, “Hungary a Member of NATO. The road membership of NATO 1990-1999”, U.S. Army War College, Strategy Research Project, April 2003
- [16] Tibor Bozo, “Hungary a Member of NATO. The road membership of NATO 1990-1999”, Strategy Research Project, April 2003
- [17] The author would like to thank professor Thomas Bruneau, and Colonel Jargalsaikhan Mendee for making the research on the effectiveness in Mongolia possible, by providing the author with relevant information..
- [18] Mendee, Jargalsaikhan and Last, David, 2008 “Whole of Government Responses in Mongolia: From Domestic Response to International Implications”, *The Pearson Papers* 11(2) pp, 1 – 22
- [19] Mendee, Jargalsaikhan and Last, David, 2008 “Whole of Government Responses in Mongolia: From Domestic Response to International Implications”, *The Pearson Papers* 11(2) p. 6
- [20] However, an interagency process, which in some countries is sponsored and promoted by an NSC-type institution, is very low in Mongolia. (Thomas C. Bruneau, Florina Cristiana Matei, Sak Sakoda, “National Security Councils: Their Potential Functions in Democratic Civil-Military Relations”, *Defense & Security Analysis*, 25:3, 255 - 269, 2009).