

GEO-POLITICAL FACTORS INFLUENCING KENYA AND TANZANIA FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR SINCE 1967

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***Abstract:** The question regarding the extent to which foreign policy influences regionalism is subject to debate. This issue is still emotive, fluid, speculative and anchored on conjecture. The study assessed geopolitical factors influencing Kenya and Tanzania foreign policy behavior since 1967. The study was guided by Two-Good theory, Neoclassical Realism and Neo-functionalism theories. Historical, cross cultural and descriptive research designs were used. The study area was Kenya and Tanzania and the population was citizens of the two states with the target population being cross border business community, government officials in Ministries of EAC and Foreign Affairs, and EAC organisms - the Secretariat and Legislative Assembly on which purposive sampling was used. A sample size of 384 respondents was created from the total population using the Gomm (2008) formula. The study utilized both primary and secondary data. Instruments of data collection were : questionnaires, interviews and focus group discussions. Findings revealed that geopolitical factors influencing Kenya's and Tanzania's foreign policies are to a large extent similar and that they have direct impact on the foreign policies of both states. That strategic location of both states as a geo-strategic factor affects both, though with significant differences. Kenya's location astride the volatile Horn of Africa has complicated its security, thus influencing its foreign policy behavior. The study recommends that in view of the similarities in geopolitical factors that influence Kenya's and Tanzania's foreign policy behavior, the two states should cooperate and harmonise their foreign policies to avoid unnecessary misunderstanding and naked and open rivalry that can thrust the region into political and economic paralysis.*

Key words: Foreign Policy, policy behavior, regional integration

1. INTRODUCTION

Geopolitics as discussed by scholars of international relations is the combination of geography and politics in structuring foreign policy of a given state. The fundamental geopolitical factors that have been central in shaping Kenya's foreign policy posture since independence are: the Indian Ocean and the struggle of the big powers; Kenya's location near the volatile and strategic Horn of Africa; the Nile River basin and Egypt's ambitions; great powers struggle for resources and influence in Africa; war on terror; instability in the Great Lakes region; and discovery of fossil fuels in East Africa.

The fervor for regionalism is etched in the minds of the political class globally. Some advocate for continental integration while others call for regional groupings that consist of few states whose defining criterion is territorial contiguity. The success story of European regionalization experiment has been cited as a factor that has inspired the recent wave of regionalism [1]. The European Union (EU) is considered as the centerpiece of resurgent regionalism. Today, neither economics nor peace serves as the main buttress for justifying further integration [2].

States around the globe are coalescing into regional blocs dictated by domestic national and foreign interests. The degree

and intensity of integration vary according to defined interests and scope. The regional integration projects thereof vary in functional scope, institutional set up, size of membership and impact [3]. The success of regional integration relies on a reasonable amount of certainty that favorable, stable conditions will continue in the future [4].

While other regions have successfully used their integration mechanisms to improve their economic welfare, Africa lags behind with respect to GDP growth, per capita income, capital inflows, and general living standards [5]. The challenges and complexities of promoting effective regional cooperation and integration are not unique to Africa however [6]. The deadlines to implement certain provisions of the Customs Union, Common Market, Monetary Union and Political Federation have largely been missed and even the implementation of the Customs Union and the Common Market is facing challenges of monumental proportions. The Customs Union was established in 2005 and Common Market in 2010, while the Monetary Union and Political Federation remain open in the sense that despite long talks and negotiations, they are still unfinished [7]. It is also characteristic that the EAC does not speak with one voice and the relationship between Partner States

may be described as asymmetric [8]. Among member states of EAC, free mobility of skilled labor has not been effectively sustained [9]. Critical steps including cross border movement of capital, free movement of labor, the rights of establishment and residence are yet to be realized in full. According to the Schedule on the Removal of Restrictions on the Free Movement of capital, Partner States committed to fully liberalize the free movement of capital in the EAC by 31 December 2015. However, the reality on the ground suggests otherwise. Therefore there is need to assess geopolitical factors influencing Kenya and Tanzania foreign policy behavior.

1.1. Statement of the Problem

The question regarding the extent to which foreign policy influences regionalism is subject to debate. This issue is still emotive, fluid, speculative and anchored on conjecture. The academic discourse in this area is unfortunately scanty. Ogunnubi, [10]. For example, focuses on foreign policy of Nigeria as a regional hegemonic power, while Kanat [11], and examines Turkey's foreign policy and its relations with the European Union (EU). On the other hand, Liao [12], focuses his paper on China's use of regional multilateralism as a distinctive element in its regional

security diplomacy. Regionalism is now an acknowledged phenomenon ensconced in international politics and encapsulated in international legal instruments. Regional integration can be defined as a grouping of states bonded together by a common set of objectives based on geographical, social, cultural, economic, and political ties and possessing a formal structure provided for in formal intergovernmental agreements [13].

As states march on into labyrinths of regional projects, the role of foreign policy and diplomacy tends to be regrettably an afterthought. There is scanty if not limited research in this area. It has to be reaffirmed that at the heart of states' interaction in regional and global settings, foreign policy occupies a significant position. Okoth [14] defines foreign policy as the sum of the principles, interests and objectives which a given state formulates in conducting its relations with other states. Foreign policy is thus understood as 'a set of goals, directives or intentions', formulated by persons in official or authoritative positions, directed at some actor or condition in the environment beyond the sovereign nation-state, for the purpose of affecting the target in the manner desired by the policymakers' [15]. It's on this ground that the study endeavored to assess geopolitical factors influencing Kenya and Tanzania foreign policy behavior.

1.2. Objective of the Study

The objective of the study was to assess geopolitical factors influencing Kenya and Tanzania foreign policy behavior since 1967.

1.3. Research Question

Which geopolitical factors influence Kenya's and Tanzania's foreign policy behavior since 1967?

1.4. Justification of the Study

1.4.1. Academic Justification

The importance of geopolitics in structuring foreign policy became unambiguous in academic discourse. A mature foreign policy that embraces the regional ethos can be the agentive foundation upon which other integration endeavors can be realized. The study, therefore, sought to underscore the importance of foreign policy in enhancing regional economics and politics. The findings will be useful in informing an academic discourse on the vitality of foreign policy in creating or deconstructing the narrative that has been around for a while that developing countries though possess the penchant to integrate, are inherently incapable of developing a common foreign policy platform to grant political wherewithal in multilateral settings. Further, international scholars will learn the importance of foreign policy as a leverage in coalescing regional groupings and conferring on such states the necessary international political legitimacy.

1.4.2. Policy Justification

The study will serve as an important source of knowledge undertaken to examine the influence of member states' foreign policy behavior on a regional grouping and its proclivity in coalescing states to collectively pursue mundane national interests in the external environment. Policymakers will draw lessons on the most suitable and appropriate framework that can be beneficial in pursuing a coordinated regional foreign policy platform that comprehensively carries with it national interests of participating states that has longevity and elasticity.

1.4.3. Philosophical Justification

Regional integration and foreign policy are products of social interactions and are constructed and formulated iteratively based on subterranean impulses that define their foundational tenets. Foreign policy is conceptualized, influenced and shaped by society. It is also a product of conceptualization by the ruling class to effect desired philosophical thrust in the external environment. Therefore, to understand the principles that characterize conceptualization of political choices by actors, it becomes imperative to investigate their worldview to sensationally appreciate the logical basis that inform subtle maneuvers that lie at the core of decision making processes.

2. GEOPOLITICAL FACTORS INFLUENCING KENYA'S FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR: KENYA AND THE HORN OF AFRICA

The Horn of Africa strategic area makes it attractive to global powers. Its importance in international politics cannot be overlooked since it is an intersection between Africa and the Middle East. In defining the security dynamics of the Horn of Africa, the region reveals an overlap of differing, sometimes conflicting governance systems, reinforcing the interdependence of the security system as well as posing critical challenges to regional peace [16].

Without doubt, there are specific politico-security strategic issues regarding to the Horn that are directly related to Kenya which shape Kenya's foreign policy orientation. The Horn is synonymous with domestic and interstate instability. This state of affairs has direct impact on Kenya's foreign policy calculations. The instability in Somalia, Ethiopia (up to 1991) and South Sudan with consequences on her security has been a source of concern in Kenya. The consequences of refugees pouring into Kenya from Somalia, South Sudan and Ethiopia continues to be a major security challenge in Kenya. With the advent of terrorism in the Horn of Africa associated to a greater

extent with the refugee issue, Kenya became exasperated and began viewing them as a security challenge. Mogire's [17] argument regarding the changing status of refugees seems to reinforce the fear that the Kenya Government has been having regarding the place of refugees in her national security calculations. He posits that the discourse regarding the status of refugees has continued to preoccupy the thinking of scholars of international relations. With time there has been a shift in the perception of refugees. Whether the refugee issue should be purely seen in humanitarian terms or security paradigm has been at the center of the discourse. This assertion is what has influenced the debate in Kenya and the matter has not been helped by the emergence of terrorism in the region and the accusation that some of the terror activities are planned and executed from some refugee camps. In a nutshell, the debate on the status of refugees will not disappear soon; it will continue to occupy a central position in international politics now and in the future.

Mogire [18] submits that Kenya and Tanzania are two of the major refugee hosting states in Africa. Their relative political stability, geo-strategic location in the Horn of Africa and Great Lakes region- Africa's major conflict and refugee producing zones has placed on them the burden of hosting the

refugees. He observes that Kenya has hosted refugees since the 1970s when Ugandans and Ethiopians fleeing political persecution and civil conflicts sought refuge in the country. It may be understood that since then, Kenya has continued to be the haven for refugees from Somalia, South Sudan, Ethiopia, and DRC among others. The refugee challenge continues to shape Kenya's foreign policy predisposition. Kenya is an avid advocate for peace and stability in the region. It has participated in the mediation efforts particularly in the Horn of Africa, including in Somalia and Sudan. The objective here is to help make peace in the two neighboring states so that the refugees can have the confidence of going back to their countries. It is believed that this will not only relieve the country of the economic burden of looking after the refugees but will also secure the country's borders. Kenya is a member of IGAD and through its structures and in collaboration with other member states, Kenya has been proactive in peace mediation efforts [19].

2.1. Geopolitical Factors Influencing Tanzania's Foreign Policy Behavior Since 1967

Following the Arusha Declaration, Tanzania changed course and pursued the foreign policy that sought to further her socialist-self-reliance ideals. Therefore, from 1967, Kenya and Tanzania pursued dichotomous foreign policies; with

Kenya maintaining her conservative-Western oriented foreign policy and Tanzania reveling in her new-found socialist-self-reliance ideology foreign policy posture. In this regard, the fundamental geopolitical factors that have been central to shaping Tanzania's foreign policy posture since their independence are: Tanzania's strategic location between East Africa and southern Africa; instability in the Great Lakes region; discovery of fossil fuels – natural gas; Nile River Basin politics; the Indian Ocean and the struggle of the big powers; big powers struggle for resources and influence in Africa; and North-South global politics.

2.2. Comparative Analysis: Geopolitical Factors Influencing Kenya's and Tanzania's Foreign Policy Behavior

There is a strong and resilient nexus between geopolitics and foreign policy. The two influence and shape each other in the international system. Geopolitics as earlier defined by Owens [20] imposes distinctive constraints on a nation's foreign policy and strategy while at the same time providing distinctive opportunities. Geopolitics has had direct influence on foreign policy formulation and projection and is an important parameter in approximating a state's ability to assert itself in the external environment. There are similarities and differences with respect to geopolitical factors that exert influence on Kenya's

and Tanzania's foreign policy orientations. The similar factors that influence the two EAC Partner States are the issue of the Indian Ocean, the Nile River politics and the position of Egypt on its water use, instability in the Great lakes Region, discovery of fossil fuels and the influence of great powers, particularly China. Assessing these similarities of geopolitical influencers, it is imperative to note that due to the proximity of the two states to each other, the majority of the geopolitical factors have direct bearing on both of them. However, there are some nuances regarding how each state projects its foreign policy or reacts to these influencers. The Indian Ocean has a significant impact on the foreign policy behavior of the two states. Kenya and Tanzania are littoral states situated on the western coast of the Indian Ocean.

The geopolitics associated with great powers and their ambition to control the Ocean has direct bearing on the two states. This fact is well acknowledged by the two states and it is in that regard that together with other littoral states, they have campaigned over the year, to rid the Ocean of weapons of mass murder. Kenya and Tanzania are cognizant of the security threat the Ocean poses to their survival if they allow it to be militarized and controlled by great powers. However, it is important to note that over the years, Tanzania has been more vociferous in her activism against militarization of the Indian Ocean than Kenya. The politics

of the Nile River and the unfair advantage that Egypt and Sudan have enjoyed for decades is another area of convergence with respect to geopolitical factors that influence the two states' foreign policy behavior. The two are upstream riparian states in the Nile Basin. The unfair treaties that were rooted in the colonial epoch that gave Egypt and Sudan exclusive right over the use of the Nile River water are the source of concern for upstream states. Egypt often proclaims its historic right to utilize the waters of the Nile citing that diabolical and illegal treaty, and regularly threatens armed action to stop the ambitions of upstream countries in encroaching the Nile water [21]. However, Kenya and Tanzania among others through the Nile Basin Initiative are adamant that each riparian state has the right to access a fair share of the Nile River waters. This historical injustice has continued to influence how foreign policies of the two states are structured.

3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

According to Wasike and Odhiambo [22], in their article, *A critique of the usefulness of theories in explaining socio-political phenomenon*, they state that: *everyone uses theories, whether they know it or not. One cannot analyze data without resorting to causal explanations. But theories often lack the specificity needed to make and*

implement decisions. As a result, policy-makers are often dismissive of the value of theories. No single theory captures the complexity of contemporary world politics. Theories of international relations seek to explain what states try to achieve in the external realm and when they try to achieve it. Theories have several components. They diagnose, predict, prescribe and evaluate. Nevertheless, Smith [23], believes that not all theories predict nor simply explain. They tell us what possibilities exist for human action and intervention. They define not merely our explanatory possibilities but also our ethical and practical horizons. For example the theory of international relations maintains that war was partly the result of international anarchy and partly the result of misunderstandings, miscalculations and recklessness on the part of politicians who had lost control of event.

3.1. Neoclassical Realism Theory

Realism theory is not per se embellished in foreign policy analysis, rather it seeks to offer predictable explanations of international politics from state-centric standpoint. Realism is based on three core assumptions about how the world works: groupism; egoism and power-centrism [24].

Neoclassical realism central argument is that relative material power establishes the basic parameters of a country's foreign policy. It avers that "the strong do

what they can and the weak suffer what they must" [25]. The proponents share a common assumption that foreign policy is best understood as the product of a country's internal dynamics. To understand why a particular country is behaving in a particular way, therefore, one should peer inside the black box and examine the preferences and configurations of key domestic actors [26]. The argument here is that foreign policy is influenced by domestic politics and vice-versa.

3.2. Neo-functionalism Theory

According to O'Neill, the Neo-functionalists theorized that as they were currently constituted, nation-states were principally concerned to perpetuate social and ideological divisions along existing faultlines they themselves had been responsible for creating social order. States were also too culturally insular, as such, incapable of meeting the more expansive functional or welfare needs of modern citizens. In this regard these needs could only be met by international cooperation. The Neo-functionalists saw regional integration as an intrinsically political process involving the need to reconcile social diversities and to balance the conflicting interest that exist in all societies, within a community framework. The introduction of a tone of politics by Neo-functionalists firmed up this school of thought and served to strengthen the argument that integration is a political process.

Chazan *et al.*; [27]; submit that Neo-functionalists believe that all political action is purposively linked with individual or group perception of interest, and thus cooperation among groups can only be the result of convergence of separate perceptions of interests.

3.3. Two-Good Theory

The Two-Good theory of foreign policy as propounded by Palmer and Morgan [28] seeks to explain the intrinsic reasons that motivate states to pursue specific foreign policy goals. It provides a general approach of foreign policy that can offer an integrated explanation for all of the events and show that the decisions leading to them are interconnected. This

theory assumes that states essentially pursue two things, namely *change and maintenance* through their international behavior and that they allocate foreign policy resources as efficiently as possible to maximize their utility. According to Palmer and Morgan [29], the basic elements of the theory are that the political universe can be viewed as consisting of issues that at least one state cares about. The world can be modeled as a multidimensional issue space. The status quo at a particular time is the existing outcome of all those issues. States will be happy with some of the outcomes and unhappy with others in the political universe. All states want to protect aspects of the world they like that serves their core national interests.




Fig. no. 1 Conceptual Model Framework Showing Interaction of Variables
Source: Researcher, 2020

4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

4.1. Research Design

Cross-cultural design was used in the study to compare and contrast foreign policy pillars of the two states and evaluate how they have influenced EAC econo-political integration process. This study sought to discover the underlying factors that influence both the independent and dependent variables hence the exploratory design was chosen as ideal in attaining this goal. Kumar [30] further reinforces the value of adopting qualitative designs by opining that the main

focus in qualitative research is to understand, explain, discover and clarify situations, feelings, perceptions, attitudes, values, beliefs and experiences of a group of people.

4.2. Study Area

The study was carried out in Kenya and Tanzania. The two are member states of the East African Community and are its core founder members with shared historical, political and social heritage making them ideal for the research. They share contiguous ethnic compositions, cross border social affiliations, geography, cultural affinity, colonial heritage and trade relations.




Fig. no. 2 Study Area-Kenya and Tanzania

Source: Researchers, 2020

These states wield preponderant influence in EAC compared to the other four, namely Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and South Sudan and, therefore, the findings accruing from the study can generally be applied across the board. In view of the complexities involved in collecting, collating and interpreting data, the other four member states of EAC were not covered in the study and this did not in any way affect the reliability or validity of the findings.

4.3. Sampling Strategy

The study adopted a purposive sampling strategy due to the nature of interpretive paradigm denoting the necessity of seeking respondents' opinions and corroborating them to examine insights and issues that are critical and pertinent to the study's objective. The justification for purposive sampling is aptly captured by Patton [31] who argues that the logic and power of purposeful sampling lie in selecting information-rich cases for study in depth.

4.4. Sample Size

The study population as already noted were citizens of Kenya and Tanzania. Given the massive combined population of the two states which is approximately 103 millions, it was not possible to practically cover every one. In this regard, the researcher adopted the recommendation provided by

Gomm [32]. Gomm [33] prescribes a formula of determining appropriate sample sizes. He proposes that for a population of 50,000 individuals, the required sample size is 381 items. He goes on to propose that for a population of size of 1,000,000 or more, the ideal sample size is 384. The same recommendation is made by Mugenda and Mugenda [34]. It was established that persons and entities that have direct stakes in the EAC integration process and who could be valuable to the study are government officials working in Ministries of Foreign and East African Community affairs, officials in the EAC Organs, the Secretariat and East African Legislative assembly and cross border business community who operate at the borders and in Partner States. In this regard, the study purposefully covered cross border business community at major points of entry between Kenya and Tanzania; government officials in the two states which perform diplomatic and administrative duties in Ministries responsible for EAC and Foreign Affairs; and EAC Secretariat and the Legislative Assembly.

4.5. Data Collection methods

Questionnaires, interviews and observations, government documents, video, tapes, newspapers, letters, and books were used [35]. Data was collected from two sources in the two countries. Primary data which

was instrumental in answering the objectives of the study were obtained from the respondents in Kenya and Tanzania including key informants in government ministries and EAC organs. Secondary data formed an integral part of the study. Secondary data were obtained from sources in Kenya and Tanzania including the EAC Secretariat's Library, books, newspapers, government documents, journals, articles and archival materials.

5. DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION

Qualitative data were first processed, summarized and categorized into appropriate themes. Content analysis was used to determine which themes occur most frequently, in what contexts and how they are related to each other [36]. Data collected through questionnaires, interviews and focus group discussions were triangulated to ascertain their efficacy. On the other hand, quantitative data which are numeric in nature were analyzed through descriptive analysis which comprises statistics describing, aggregating and presenting the constructs of interest. Inferential statistics arising from the findings were interpreted to reach conclusions about associations among variables. Charts, graphs, tables were used to project and compare scenarios and

any other piece of information that can be best presented quantitatively.

6. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

6.1. Geopolitical Factors Influencing Kenya and the Horn of Africa

The Horn of Africa is associated with violence and conflict. It is synonymous with instability of interstate and intra-state nature. In view of this Kenya's stability is at risk. It is in this regard that 65.8 per cent of the respondents submitted that Kenya has serious security interests in the Horn and that indeed the geopolitics associated with the Horn of Africa shape Kenya's foreign policy predisposition. Some of the 34.2 per cent of the respondents who did not consider the Horn of Africa as a geopolitical factor that influences Kenya's foreign policy behavior thought that its instability is none of Kenya's concern. They also argued that since trade interactions between Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia are not significant, the Horn cannot shape how Kenya relates in the international system. However, one respondent among those who identified it as a serious geopolitical factor for Kenya, made a moving remark during interview by stating:

It is obvious, we are part of the Horn of Africa in every sense of it. The instability in the Horn is our cause of concern. We continue

to monitor events in the Horn and if possible we influence them in our favor. We participated in the Sudan and Somalia peace processes to secure ourselves. However, you may note that due to the same instability big powers see Kenya as a stabilizing force and the gateway to East Africa. Consequently some have set up military bases in Kenya (29 July 2020, Nairobi).

This poignant statement is valid and affirms the geopolitical significance of the Horn of Africa in structuring Kenya's foreign policy behavior. Burgess [37] examines stabilization, peace and sustainability in an unstable and famine-prone region like the Horn of Africa. He observes that the Horn combines high levels of environmental stress and interstate conflict, civil wars, and communal clashes. This is what has been the orthodoxy view of scholars and practitioners. This is the case despite the fact that the Horn is an area of geopolitical interest to super and middle powers. It remains transfixed in the international system as the vanguard of global rivalry and egoism. In 1977 a US House of Representatives' Facilitating Mission to Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya returned to the US espousing the view that the Horn of Africa is the area on the African continent with the greatest potential for East-West confrontation. It is the Horn's proximity to the Middle

East oil fields and the Indian Ocean and Red Sea trade routes which elevates its strategic importance [38]. The Lefebvre submission asserts the strategic interests that the superpowers have had over the Horn. That this sub-region is strategically located next to the volatile yet important Middle East. The international politics has have revolved around the Middle East because of its abundance of natural fuels and the juxtaposed importance of the Gulf in global geopolitical calculations.

6.2. Geopolitical Factors Influencing Kenya's Foreign Policy Behavior: The Nile River Basin

The Nile River Basin is an important geopolitical factor that shapes foreign policies of regional states. The Nile River since history continues to exert significant influence on how the riparian states especially between the upstream and low stream ones relate among themselves and with external actors. Since the end of the twentieth and the beginning of twenty-first century, the realm of international relations has been characterized by resource geopolitics – the potential for conflict as a result of the scarcity of vital resources that cross political boundaries [39]. Given the reduced water availability due to population growth, degradation and depletion

of the Nile River and its uneven distribution, fierce competition over the already diminishing water resources increases the potential for an inter-riparian conflict in its basin [40]. This postulation is true and speaks to the brutal truth that confronts the Nile Basin. The Nile River has the implication on the very survival of so many people whose livelihoods depend on it in the riparian states. This reality has the potential to raise tensions in the riparian states if some of them feel that there is no fairness in the sharing of the most important resource – the waters. The issue of sharing the Nile River waters among the riparian states and the unjust claims that Egypt asserts over the control of the use of the waters appear to have not been considered by a significant number of the respondents as an important geopolitical factor that influences Kenya's foreign policy behavior.

The study established that only 42 per cent of the respondents felt that the Nile River Basin geopolitics influences Kenya's foreign policy. The 58 per cent who did not regard it as such were vividly influenced by the fact that the Nile River Basin has never occupied the political psyche of Kenya. It has never been a hot political issue that ever generated serious public discourse to the extent that political and social groups could deeply get involved. One respondent made the following submission:

I think the sharing of the Nile Basin water has never become an issue for public discourse and has never been prosecuted in the media or other public forums to the extent that passions and even the sense of patriotism is awakened. The majority of Kenyans come into contact with the Nile water issue in class, where it is extensively written about how the natives of the East African territories under the British colonial regime were not involved in the negotiations that led to the 1929 treaty that over their heads allocated all the Nile waters to Egypt alone (15 August 2020, Nairobi).

This statement, as articulated by the respondent is true. The issue of the Nile water use has never influenced the direction of politics in Kenya. This is not to say that it does not matter as a strategic national interest issue. Indeed it matters to a large extent and this is the reality. Despite the fact that Kenya has been active in opposing the unfair treaty, it has not sought to whip the public to focus on it as an important issue that occupies its top priority and becomes an influencer of national discourse. It is true that imperial Britain committed an unpardonable injustice by crafting an illegal treaty and secretly signing it with Egypt, to deny East African states the right to

access their own resources. Adar [41] supports this assertion. He submits that the main concern in regard to the Nile River water use by the riparian states of the Nile, emanates from the unfair and illegal the 1929 Nile River treaty which provides that Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Sudan cannot use the waters of Lake Victoria and the Nile without the acquiescence of Egypt. He cites paragraph 27 of the illegal treaty, which for examples stipulates in part that:

Save with the previous agreement of the Egyptian Government, no irrigation or power works or measures are to be constructed or taken on the River Nile or its branches or on the lakes from which it flows, so far as all these are in the Sudan or in countries under British administration, which would, in such manner as to entail any prejudice to the interests of Egypt, either reduce the quantity of water arriving in Egypt, or modify the date of its arrival, or lower its level [42].

He argues that Kenya's interest in the Nile River water is as a result of the fact that it is a water scarce country. In this regard, the Nile water question has direct implications for Kenya's national interest. Adar [43], observes that Kenya's interest in Nile River Basin goes beyond water use, it has to do with the need to maintain regional stability which

is central to its economic interests. He notes that Kenya is one of the dominant trading partners in the Nile Basin region, which makes the issue of stability a major concern for the country's foreign policy-making establishment. He avers that Kenya has not constructed a policy on the Nile water and he views this lacuna as regrettable. Adar's submission somehow supports the assertion by the respondent who pointed that the Nile water issue has not been at center of national conversation in Kenya. It has not influenced national debate so passionately to the extent that groups with divergent opinions emerge. In view of the lack of a clearly defined policy position which is unambiguous and direct with respect to the Nile water use despite strong opposition that Kenya normally express, Adar [44], persuasively argues that as a sovereign independent state, Kenya has the right to question the validity and relevance of treaties entered into by the colonial administrations that hold the potential of undermining the national interest and creating instability in the region.

The question of the Nile River and the politics that surrounds it can be traced to the colonial epoch. Tesfye [45] lucidly posits that although the Nile River has been associated with Egypt since antiquity, that association

has short-shifted upstream states – particularly Ethiopia, from which Egypt gets 86 per cent of her water and tons of soil every year, without which she it cannot survive. He goes on to argue that the Egyptian control of the Nile River and its tributaries was initiated by Britain while it exercised colonial rule through the imposed regime of the 1929 Agreement, which was modified in 1959 with a bilateral agreement, to the detriment of Ethiopia and the newly independent upstream African states. Tesfaye’s argument paints an image of colonial injustice that deprived the riparian states of their rights to use the waters of the Nile River. The illegal agreement which was engineered by Britain created a hegemon in the name of Egypt to preside over the waters of the Nile River as though other states who are the real owners of the waters that flow into the Nile have no legal rights to access their own natural resource.

In summary, the geopolitical factors that influence Kenya’s foreign policy as submitted by the respondents are summarized in Table 1 and Figure 3. Kenya’s geopolitical factors are shown in percentages based on the findings as presented in Table 1. The percentages of the foreign policy pillars were calculated and are presented in figure 3.

Table 1. Geo-political Factors that Influence Kenya’s Foreign Policy (percentage scores)

1.	Indian Ocean and great power rivalry.	75%
2.	Horn of Africa geopolitics	68%
3.	Kenya’s war on terror	71%
4.	China Vs US Rivalry over Africa	91%
5.	Instability in the great lakes region	77.5%
6.	Discovery of fossil fuels	56%
7.	The Nile River basin politics	42%

Source: Field Data, 2020

Figure 3 provides a summary of geopolitical factors that influence how Kenya structures its foreign policy. Geopolitical factors have an overwhelming influence on formulation and projection of foreign policy. The Indian Ocean and the rivalry of superpowers, the Horn of Africa, war on terror originating from the Horn, China and US rivalry, the instability in the Great Lakes region, the discovery of fossil fuels in Kenya and the Nile Basin are well articulated as the geopolitical factors that must be taken into account regarding Kenya’s foreign policy formulation and projection.




Fig. no. 3 Geopolitical Factors that Influence Kenya's Foreign Policy Behavior Since 1967
Source: Field Data, 2020

6.3. Geopolitical Factors Influencing Tanzania's Foreign Policy Behavior: South-South Global Politics

The south-south cooperation can be traced back to the historic Asian-African Conference, or the Bandung Conference, held in Indonesia on April 18-24, 1955, to promote political self-determination, mutual respect for sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, and equality, as well as the establishment of the Non-Aligned movement in 1961 – at the height of the Cold War – by third world countries [46]. South-South

cooperation was the coalescing of weak states majorly found in the southern hemisphere to advance their interests in the face of cut-throat competition by the superpowers.

The objectives of the cooperation went beyond mere momentary reactions to global events. It was a forum through which third world countries advocated for fairness in global trade and political transactions. Tanzania was a strong and active member of the south-south grouping. This claim was supported by 70 per cent of the respondents who submitted that indeed Tanzania's foreign policy was

influenced by the North-South and South-South cooperation politics. They argued that Tanzania's foreign policy since independence has been based on principles that underpin fairness and justice in the global economic and political systems. The 30 per cent of the respondents did not regard south-south cooperation as an important geopolitical factor that influences Tanzania's foreign policy. With commercial diplomacy being the centerpiece of Tanzania's foreign policy, south-south activist diplomacy appear to have taken a back banner.

Scott [47], argues that south-south trade has become a core component of the contemporary trade debate, but the idea of using preferential trade agreements among developing countries to foster industrialization and diminish dependence on the North has a long history. The logical argument that can be drawn from Scott's submission is that due to sharp divisions arising from mismatched interests between the two halves, the North-South cooperation became untenable hence the creation of the so called south-south cooperation. Unfairness in global trade transactions that Tanzania was against, for example was ably amplified by President

Nyerere in his address in London in November 1975 at the height of the oil crisis:

But rich countries do not only increase the price of a tractor to the extent of the extra oil costs directly involved in producing it. They also make the new prices compensate the workers and the owners for the higher oil prices involved in producing the goods which they want to consume. For the workers in wealthy countries get 'cost of living' increases to prevent their standard of living from falling. And the owners seek to arrange that their profits should not go down in real terms. Both these costs are covered by additions to the price of goods they sell. As a result we do not only pay from our poverty for the extra wealth acquired from us by the oil producers. We also compensate the people in the wealthy countries for any loss which they experienced through a transfer of wealth from their economies to the oil producers [48].

This statement confirms structural and administrative bottlenecks the developed countries situated in the north have imposed on developing countries found in the southern hemisphere. As Nyerere puts it, these injustices have denied developing countries an opportunity to transform themselves and embark on a sustainable path of economic

development. The global north has the capacity to control, disrupt and even stifle processes aimed at assisting poor countries in the south. Nyerere's postulation with respect to the exploitative behavior of the wealthy states of the North conjures a state of immorality on the part of these powerful states in their determination to subjugate poor states from global south to ignominious exploitation and abuse. It is in this regard that Tanzania's foreign policy was structured around south-south cooperation politics with strong and vibrant anti-imperialism and anti-exploitation tinge.

Tanzania's remonstrations against global systems that proffers exploitation and injustices was to a large extent motivated by her domestic scene. Frangonikolopoulos [49] argue that Tanzania adopted the anti-Western politics, the Arusha Declaration and self-reliance policy due to the dependence syndrome created by the British metropole and the fact that in early 1960s her economy was dominated by the British investments and manufactured goods. Tanzania's foreign policy behavior in regard to north-south politics and south-south cooperation was resilient, vociferous and rigid. The objective was to assert her independence against

geopolitical forces controlled by the big powers. Such a strategic region with a big population is susceptible to geopolitical aggression from global powers. If this is allowed to happen, then EAC can become a mere satellite region of global actors. States or regions that depend on one or the other global actors politically and economically cannot engender home-grown economic development. It is therefore, the solemn duty of EAC member states to entrench economic and political safeguards in their foreign policies to ensure that EAC remains independent and can do business with global actors without undue influence. The respondents (68 per cent) advised that EAC should be an independent entity able to pursue its own strategic objectives without external interference. The geopolitical factors that influence Tanzania's foreign policy behavior as submitted by the respondents are summarized in figure 4. In summary, the geopolitical factors that influence Tanzania's foreign policy as submitted by the respondents are summarized in table 2 and figure 4. Tanzania's geopolitical factors are scored in percentages based on the findings as shown in table 2. The percentages of the foreign policy pillars were calculated and are presented in figure 4.

Table 2. The Geopolitics Factors that Influence Tanzania’s Foreign Policy (percentage scores)

1.	Tanzania’s strategic location and involvement in Southern Africa liberation struggle	98%
2.	Instability in the great lakes region	82%
3.	Discovery of fossil fuels	74%
4.	Nile River basin politics	63%
5.	The Indian Ocean geopolitics	93.5%
6.	China’s influence in Africa	97%
7.	South-south global politics	70%

Source: Field Data, 2020




Fig. no. 4 Geopolitical Factors that Influence Tanzania’s Foreign Policy Behavior (total percentages).

Source: Field Data, 2020

Figure 4 provides a summary of the geopolitical factors that influence Tanzania’s foreign policy. The most conspicuous geopolitical factors that have an overwhelming influence over Tanzania’s foreign policy posture are: its strategic location between East and Southern

Africa, the Indian Ocean geopolitics and North-south China’s influence in Africa. These three geopolitical factors were considered by the respondents to have significant influence over Tanzania’s foreign policy behavior since 1967. The second tier of geopolitical factors

that influence how Tanzania conduct its foreign policy are the instability in the Great Lakes region, discovery of fossil fuels and North-South global politics. The last tier of geopolitical factors is only one and this is the Nile River Basin politics.

7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

It was established that geopolitical factors that influence Kenya's and Tanzania's foreign policies are to a large extent similar and that they have direct impact on the foreign policies of both states. In this regard, it is necessary that the two EAC member states develop a mechanism to coordinate their foreign policies in order to promote the welfare of EAC and defend the region's interests. However, it was established that the strategic location of both states as a geo-strategic factor affects both though with significant differences. Kenya's location astride the volatile Horn of Africa has complicated its security, thus influencing its foreign policy behavior.

8. RECOMMENDATION

This study recommends that in view of the similarities in geopolitical factors that influence Kenya's and Tanzania's foreign policy behavior, the two states should cooperate

to limit the negative influence of these factors. The two states should cooperate and harmonize their foreign policies to avoid unnecessary misunderstanding and naked and open rivalry that can thrust the region into political and economic paralysis. It is not necessary to work at cross purpose on common issues of mutual interest between the two countries.

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